WSEmail: A Retrospective on a System for Secure Internet Messaging Based
  on Web Services by May, Michael J. et al.
WSEmail: A Retrospective on a System for Secure Internet
Messaging Based on Web Services
Kevin D. Lux
University of Pennsylvania, Rowan University
kevin@kevinlux.info
Michael J. May
Kinneret Academic College
mjmay@kinneret.ac.il
Carl A. Gunter
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
cgunter@illinois.edu
Abstract
Web services offer an opportunity to redesign a va-
riety of older systems to exploit the advantages of
a flexible, extensible, secure set of standards. In this
work we revisit WSEmail, a system proposed over ten
years ago to improve email by redesigning it as a fam-
ily of web services. WSEmail offers an alternative vi-
sion of how IM and email services could have evolved,
offering security, extensibility, and openness in a dis-
tributed environment instead of the hardened walled
gardens that today’s rich messaging systems have be-
come. We demonstrate the flexibility of WSEmail us-
ing three business use cases: secure channel IM, busi-
ness workflows with routed forms, and on-demand
attachments. Since increased flexibility often miti-
gates against security and performance, we designed
WSEmail with security in mind and formally proved
the security of one of its core protocols (on-demand
attachments) using the TulaFale and ProVerif auto-
mated proof tools. We also provide performance mea-
sures for the basic WSEmail functions in a prototype
we implemented using .NET. Our experiments show
a latency of about a quarter of a second per transac-
tion under load.
Keywords Internet electronic mail, web services,
WSEmail, security, performance, rich messaging, on-
demand attachments, email workflow
1 Introduction
Web services are a mature technology nearing their
twentieth birthday. They have created the founda-
tion for highly interoperable distributed systems to
communicate over the Internet using standardized
protocols (e.g. SOAP, JSON) and security mech-
anisms (e.g. OAuth, XMLDSIG). Legacy systems
and protocols must be reevaluated to see how they
can benefit from modern architectures, standards,
and tools. As a case study of such an analysis and
redesign, we present an expanded study of WSE-
mail [17], electronic mail redesigned as a family of web
services which we first implemented and presented in
2005.
Such a return is warranted due to a consideration
of how internet messaging technologies have evolved
in the past decade and a half. When we first imple-
mented WSEmail, email and instant messaging (IM)
services were strictly disjoint. Instant messaging so-
lutions (e.g. AIM, ICQ) were server centric, offered
little to no security, had weak authentication, and
worked only when both sides were online. Email ser-
vices were more mature with endpoint security and
authentication options, but in order to support uni-
formity across a vast installed based, the resulting
system had shortcomings in the areas of flexibility, se-
curity, and integration with other messaging systems.
For instance, problems of remote authentication and
extensibility plagued attempts to reduce spam, while
poor integration with browsers and operating systems
made it a vector for the propagation of viruses, mal-
ware, and ransomware. In the intervening years, IM
and email have evolved separately.
Email has become hardened with the standard-
ization of spam blocking (e.g. real time black hole
lists, policy block lists), DomainKeys Identified Mail
(DKIM), Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC), and encryption by default between Mail
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Transfer Agents (MTAs). Together, they made email
more secure in transit and reduced the quantity of
received spam. Push notifications changed the speed
at which users see email, but the fundamental mes-
sage format (7-bit ASCII with MIME) has remained
unchanged. Importantly, it has remained an open
system with distributed management and no central
point of control.
In parallel, IM underwent fundamental changes as
the new generation of tools (e.g. Facebook Messen-
ger, WhatsApp, Skype, Slack, WeChat) introduced
stronger authentication, end-to-end message security,
and rich communications features such as bots, mini-
applications, and video chat. IM apps cache messages
sent or received while offline and can show proof of
delivery. In contrast to email services, IM networks
have become “closed gardens” with little to no inter-
operability. With few exceptions, access is available
only via dedicated clients via a central point of con-
trol. Support for offline sending and receiving blur
the conceptual boundaries between IM and email, but
IM security protocols (e.g. Signal Protocol [10]) are
centralized, preventing distributed management and
customizations. No integration with email is possible.
It didn’t have to be this way.
We built WSEmail to replace the legacy protocols
with protocols based on SOAP, WSDL, XMLDSIG
and other XML-based formats. The protocols are
proven technologically (they have been standardized
for over 15 years) and they are inherently extensible,
give stronger guarantees for message authentication,
and are amenable to formal modeling and proof.
WSEmail is designed to perform the functions of
ordinary email but also enable additional security
functions and more flexibility. The primary strat-
egy is to import these virtues from the standards
and development platforms for web services. Our
exploration of WSEmail is based on a prototype ar-
chitecture and implementation. WSEmail messages
are SOAP messages that use web service security fea-
tures to support integrity, authentication, and access
control for both end-to-end and hop-by-hop message
transmissions. The WSEmail platform supports the
dynamic updating of messaging protocols on both
client Mail User Agents (MUAs) and server MTAs
to enable custom communications. This flexibility
supports the introduction of new security protocols,
richer message routing (such as routing based on the
semantics of a message), and close integration with
diverse forms of communication such as IM.
The benefits of flexibility can be validated by show-
ing diverse applications. We show the flexibility of
WSEmail by detailing three applications we have im-
plemented based on its framework: secure instant
messaging, secure business workflow messaging, and
“on-demand attachments,” in which email with an at-
tachment leaves the attachment on the sender’s server
rather than placing it on the servers of the recipi-
ents. We achieve all of this while avoiding becoming
a “closed garden” by explicitly considering extensi-
bility and on-demand download of client extensions.
This allows endpoint servers to design their own rich
messaging extensions and deploy them locally while
maintaining interoperability with external systems.
Flexibility, however, often has a high cost for se-
curity and performance. We therefore develop tech-
niques to measure and mitigate these costs for WSE-
mail. WSEmail’s first contribution was a case study
of a formal analysis of on-demand attachments. The
challenge was to design the associated security for
the attachment based on emerging federated identity
systems. Due to space restrictions, the proof is not re-
produced here, but can be found in Lux et al. [17] and
in an online appendix (http://www2.kinneret.ac.
il/mjmay/wsemail/). In this work, we first detail the
architecture of WSEmail and three of its applications.
They show the flexibility that we can achieve using
our architecture while still providing strong security
guarantees. Second, we carry out a set of experiments
intended to determine the efficiency of our base sys-
tem, including its security operations. Since email
systems need to also have good performance on older
hardware, we show our experiments on a testbed built
from older hardware. Both of these studies demon-
strate promise for security and performance for web
services in general and WSEmail in particular.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we sketch
the architecture of WSEmail focusing on its secu-
rity assumptions and then continue with a discus-
sion about how plug-ins function. In section 3 we
discuss interface details of the WSEmail base archi-
tecture, including detailed descriptions of how mes-
sages are sent and received. Section 4 discusses ap-
plications we have explored with WSEmail, includ-
ing instant messaging (IM), semantic based rout-
ing for business workflows, and on-demand attach-
ments. In section 5 we discuss our implementation
and its performance. Section 6 discusses related work
and compares WSEmail to similar messaging sys-
tems. Section 7 concludes. Interested readers can
find more information on our project web page at
http://www2.kinneret.ac.il/mjmay/wsemail/.
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Figure 1: Messaging architecture
2 Base Architecture
The base protocols for WSEmail are illustrated in
Figure 1. In the common case, similar to SMTP, an
MUA Sender Client SC1 makes a call on its MTA
Sender Server SS to send a message M1. This and
other calls are SOAP calls over TCP; the message M1
is in the body of the SOAP message and the SOAP
header contains information like the type of call and
security parameters. The message is structured as a
collection of XML elements, including, for instance,
a subject header. A sample trace of WSEmail mes-
sages can be found at http://www2.kinneret.ac.
il/mjmay/wsemail/. After receiving the call from
SC1, the server SS makes a call on the Receiver Server
RS to deliver the mail from the Sender Domain SD
to the Receiver Domain RD. The Receiver Client RC
makes calls to RS to inquire about new messages or
download message bodies. In particular, RC makes
a call to RS to obtain message headers and then can
request message M1.
Our design is based on a three-tier authentication
system combined with an extensible system of feder-
ated identities. The first tier provides user (MUA)
authentication based on passwords, public keys, or
federated identity tokens. The second tier provides
server (MTA) authentication based on public keys
with certificates similar to those used for TLS. The
third tier uses root certificates similar to the ones
in browsers. Overall, this addresses interdomain au-
thentication in a practical way at the cost of full end-
to-end confidentiality. Confidentiality is preserved
between hops by TLS or another tunnel protocol. In
a basic instance, the message from SC1 to RC will be
given an XMLDSIG signature by SS that is checked
by both RS and RC.
The novel aspects of WSEmail’s architecture are in
the integration and flexibility of the MUA authenti-
cation and the ability of both MUAs and MTAs to
Figure 2: Client components
add new security functions dynamically. To illustrate
a variation in the base protocol, consider our design
for IM. Referring again to Figure 1, an instant mes-
sage M2 is dispatched from a client SC2 to RC while
SC2 is outside its home domain SD. In this case SC2
contacts SS to obtain a security token T that will be
recognized by RS. Once this is obtained, SC sends
M2 authenticated with this credential to RS and in-
dicates (in a SOAP header) that it should be treated
as an instant message by RS and RC. Instant mes-
sages are posted directly to the client, with the client
now viewed as a server that accepts the instant mes-
sage call. RS and RC are able to apply access control
for this function based on the security token from SC.
This token is recognized because of a prior arrange-
ment between SS and RS.
The WSEmail MUA and MTA are based on a plug-
in architecture capable of dynamic extensions. Secu-
rity for such extensions is provided though a policy
for trusted sources and the enforcement mechanisms
provided by web services. On-demand attachments
are an example of such a plug-in, as are a variety of
kinds of attachments with special semantics. A party
that sends a message with such an attachment au-
tomatically includes information for the receiver on
where to obtain the software necessary to process the
attachment. The client provides hooks for plug-ins
to access security tokens, after first performing an
access control check on the plug-in. Figure 2 illus-
trates the MUA (client) components. Screen shots of
the GUI can be seen in Figure 8 (detailed below) and
at http://www2.kinneret.ac.il/mjmay/wsemail/.
A figure illustrating the server (MTA) components is
shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Server Components
3 Interfaces and Plug-ins
To explain how the WSEmail architecture works, we
outline its code and plug-in architecture and inter-
faces. The interfaces describe how much access the
application has to the mail server or client software,
in addition to where the plug-in is activated for mes-
sage delivery or reading. Plug-ins are used on both
the server and the client. Their interactions and com-
munication paths are the source of WSEmail’s flexi-
bility and extensibility.
3.1 Server-side Plug-ins
Server plug-ins are libraries of code that conform to
certain interfaces known to the server. When the
server is initialized, it goes through a list of plug-ins
to load from a configuration file. For each plug-in, a
specific object class is listed along with the name of a
library from which it can be loaded. The server looks
for the library and tries to instantiate the object. If it
successfully loads the plug-in, the server will request
further configuration data from the plug-in and use
it to place the plug-in in the appropriate execution
queue. The process of loading or unloading plug-ins
is dynamic, so they can be loaded or unloaded at
any time during execution. In addition, the execu-
tion queues can be reprioritized or disabled while the
server is running.
All server plug-ins implement the IServerPlugin in-
terface, which allows the server to understand the
purpose of the plug-in and add the plug-in to the
appropriate processing queues. There are two main
classes of plug-ins in WSEmail: message dependent
and RPC-like (or message-independent). Some ex-
ample plug-ins and their classifications are shown in
Figure 4.
Message dependent plug-ins depend on a message
to be present to execute. They can be inserted in
4
Figure 4: Example server plug-ins and their classifi-
cations
various places in the delivery cycle, including the ini-
tial receipt of a message (ISendingProcessor) or the
final destination of a message (IDeliveryProcessor).
Plug-ins that implement ISendingProcessor perform
processing similar to that done by sendmail (such as
verifying relay permissions, stripping oversized at-
tachments, etc) in regular mail systems. Plug-ins
that implement IDeliveryProcessor do similar actions
to user-space programs such as procmail or vacation
messaging scripts in regular mail systems. A diagram
depicting the interactions and data flow of incoming
WSEmail and extension requests is show in Figure 5.
Figure 5: An overview of server side plug-ins
RPC-like plug-ins implement a generic “catch-all”
interface (IExtensionProcessor). On initializing, the
plug-ins provide the server with an “extension iden-
tifier”. The extension identifier is used by the server
to route incoming requests to the appropriate plug-
in. There is no required or defined structure for the
requests. Most plug-ins view requests as XML docu-
ments or fragments. This provides flexibility in terms
of the data an application can process.
The plug-ins in the system are executed after the
core server has performed message authentication.
The server authenticates a message by examining
its attached security tokens such as X.509 certifi-
cates, username signatures, or federated identity cer-
tificates. If the security tokens are valid, the mes-
sage is entered into a queue to be processed by the
appropriate plug-ins. In the case of IExtensionPro-
cessor and IDeliveryProcessor plug-ins, an “environ-
ment” object is created and passed to the plug-in to
allow access to authentication tokens and raw XML
streams directly from the server. Other plug-ins are
only given the message that triggered their execution.
Plug-ins can implement more than one interface,
which allows increased functionality in one piece of
code. Some plug-ins implement both the IExtension-
Processor and the IDeliveryProcessor (or any variant)
interfaces. This allows them to interact with mes-
sages as they are being delivered, but also to be con-
figurable using a protocol that interacts with the IEx-
tensionProcessor interface. Implementing multiple
interfaces allows plug-ins to share data that should be
accessible though multiple paths. Examples of useful
composite plug-ins (plug-ins implementing multiple
interfaces) are given in Section 4.
We implemented some server plug-ins in WSE-
mail that would be expected for enterprise applica-
tions: data store access (IDataAccessor), database
connection management (IDatabaseManager) mes-
sage queues (IMailQueue), and local delivery (ILo-
calMTA).
3.2 Client-side Plug-ins
Client-side plug-ins affect message reading and are
designed to be more dynamic than server-side plug-
ins. Similar to server-side plug-ins, client-side plug-
ins are code libraries, but for ease of implemen-
tation they extend an abstract class (Dynamic-
Forms.BaseObject) instead of implementing an in-
terface. They also contain more information than
their server-side counterparts, including version and
network location information. With this additional
information, a plug-in can create messages that can
be processed by other clients that do not have the
5
Figure 6: Sample application (a timesheet)
plug-in installed. This is accomplished by having a
stub that is executed by the receiving client to down-
load the plug-in using its supplied location informa-
tion. The user is given the chance to approve the
downloaded before it is performed. Plug-in code is
self-signed using Microsoft Authenticode. The plug-
in information (version, name and library location) is
saved in a local registry that allows the recipient to
use the same plug-in at a later point.
The interface that a plug-in presents to the user
is up to the plug-in designer. A plug-in can have no
interface at all, a few message boxes, or a rich graph-
ical user interface (GUI). Since WSEmail is based
upon the .NET framework, plug-in designers can use
.NET’s rich UI elements without the need to trans-
fer libraries for rendering graphics. A sample plug-in
interface is shown in Figure 6. Plug-ins also have ac-
cess to authentication information in the mail client
and may petition users for access to their federated
token. This allows plug-ins to perform secure web
service calls to automatically fill in information or
perform other functions.
For convenience and to limit bandwidth used, mul-
tiple plug-ins can be contained within one library file.
Each plug-in will be enumerated (via .NET’s reflec-
tion libraries) and registered with the client appli-
Figure 7: Client-side plug-ins from the sender’s per-
spective
Figure 8: New message screen
cation. This allows system administrators to deploy
one library with updated plug-ins instead of deploy-
ing each one separately.
3.3 Sending a message
When Alice wants to send a message to Bob that
takes advantage of a plug-in, she attaches a “form”
from her registry to her message (Figure 8). The form
presents Alice with a user interface (UI) that lets her
fill in required information. After filling out the form,
the information in it is serialized to an XML docu-
ment that is attached to the message. The original
message is notified by the plug-in where about where
it should be sent next for the message to be appro-
priately processed; in this case, Bob’s inbox. The
plug-in is unloaded and a flag is set on the message
header that indicates the presence of a form. The flag
is displayed in Alice’s list of sent messages and Bob’s
inbox when he receives it, allowing them to see which
messages in their inbox contain a form by viewing
the header information and without downloading all
message content. Figure 7 illustrates the process.
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Figure 9: Client-side plug-ins from the recipient’s
perspective
3.4 Receiving a message
When Bob’s server receives Alice’s message, he sees
the new message appear in his inbox with an annota-
tion indicating that the message contains an attached
form. He can view the message normally, but can also
view the attached form. When Bob tries to view the
form, the mail client attempts to load the appropri-
ate plug-in or obtain it if it is not present on the
system using information contained in the recipient’s
plug-in registry and information contained within the
form. After the plug-in is loaded, the XML document
containing the payload of the form is pushed to the
plug-in which deserializes the data and loads neces-
sary state. The plug-in then takes control, displaying
a graphical interface that includes the information
Alice sent. Figure 9 demonstrates the typical flow
for the recipient of a message with a form attached.
4 Applications
WSEmail offers the possibility to have rich XML for-
mats, extensible semantics on clients and routers, and
a range of security tokens. Since there are substantial
development platforms for these features from major
software vendors, it is easy to use WSEmail as a foun-
dation for a suite of integrated applications that share
common code, routing, security, and other features.
As an illustration, we sketch three applications that
we implemented with our prototype system.
4.1 Instant Messaging
Instant messaging is similar to email but is in-
tended for communicating short text messages syn-
chronously. An overview of a standard instant mes-
saging architecture is shown in Figure 10. Instant
messaging systems are typically disjoint from email
systems using different clients, servers, routing, and
security. This is unfortunate since the two messaging
systems have many things in common. We experi-
mented with a form of integration for the two by al-
lowing WSEmails to be marked as instant messages
(see the New Message screen in Figure 8). Such mes-
sages are posted directly to a window on the recipient
client by the client server, subject to an access control
decision. Our implementation uses the same client,
server, software, and security as the email functions.
There is an option that allows multiple parties to use
SSL tunnels to a single server.
Figure 10: Instant Messaging Overview
WSEmail’s instant messaging plug-in is a compos-
ite plug-in, made up of an IDeliveryProcessor and an
IExtensionProcessor implementation. When the in-
stant messaging client program is started, the user
automatically registers her location on the server us-
ing the IExtensionProcessor interface. The plug-in
records the location information in an internal table.
Later, when the server receives a message flagged as
an instant message, it passes delivery control of the
message to the instant messaging plug-in using the
IDeliveryProcessor interface. The plug-in consults its
table of user locations and, if it finds a match, sends
the message directly to the client. If a match is not
found, the plug-in relinquishes control of the message,
passing it back to the server. The server can then at-
tempt delivery using a different matching plug-in.
Instant messages are sent to clients using Microsoft
.NET Remoting. Similar to Java’s RMI, Remoting
allows an object to be distributed across a network.
Clients remote their instant message queues and have
a separate thread watch it. As the server pushes
messages into the queue, the client watcher thread
pulls them out and coordinates their display into a
conversation-like interface.
After a conversation has been established, users
can choose to change to a synchronous channel. An
additional server-side plug-in coordinates the shift
from asynchronous WSEmail messages to a “party
line” secured with Transport Layer Security (TLS).
7
At the user’s request, the plug-in allocates a TCP
port running TLS and notifies all participants in the
conversation of the available channel. The TLS ports
do not have to be opened on the mail server itself,
so it is possible for the mail server to act as a bro-
ker and pass the connection request on to a secure
chat server farm. The recipients of the invitations
are given a choice to accept the channel conversion.
When connecting to the secure chat server, the clients
are presented with the server’s X.509 certificate and
are asked to present their own certificates for authen-
tication purposes. Clients who do not provide a cer-
tificate are not able to join the new secured chat ses-
sion.
The secure channel instant message brokering gives
allows users to create secure channels with arbitrary
groups of people. Since the messaging flows over the
TLS channel, they do not have the lag of the com-
position and forwarding of a WSEmail message. If
the users have an existing X.509 architecture, they
can easily authenticate to each other. If they lack
a shared X.509 architecture, everyone (including the
server) will need to set up certificate trust relation-
ships.
4.2 Business Workflows
Many organizations are working to carry out more
of their management of workflows (i.e. forms) using
web forms or other web techniques. In implementing
such a system, there is a choice between a centralized
system where a single web server is used by all par-
ties, versus a decentralized system where information
is routed by email. Email systems tend to work better
with loosely described workflows and loosely coupled
participants, such as ad hoc collaborations between
enterprises where neither organization is willing or
able to carry out all functions on a web server man-
aged by the other party.
WSEmail supports the management of workflows
using routed forms, attachments that are sent to par-
ticular people or roles in a specified order. Routed
forms use the client-side plug-ins to create a rich user
interface. The forms are designed to look similar
to their paper counterparts. We created prototypes
for time sheets (Figure 6) and requisition forms, in-
cluding an interface to enter the required data and
rules that specify which roles in the organization must
“sign off” on the form to have it approved. A sam-
ple workflow scenario of a form which must be passed
through a chain of recipients to receive final approval
is shown in Figure 11.
The sender follows the steps described above in the
message sending section. In our prototype the forms
are much smarter than their paper counterparts.
They can, for example, provide basic spreadsheet-like
functionality or automatically populate data using
the user’s federated token and a secure web service
query to a human resources database. To address
the security of the workflow, each user has a unique
X.509 certificate with the certificate’s common name
(CN) as the user’s email address. A person in the
workflow signs off on the form by attaching a digital
signature to the XML. The message thereby acquires
an approval list that can be verified and audited by a
third party. In particular, the verifier can use X.509
certificates to check that the data has not been tam-
pered with and can authenticate the approval of each
member in the workflow.
As an extension of the workflow model, users can
delegate their responsibilities. Delegation is done by
a user providing the name or names of people who
can sign off on a form instead of him. This adds a
powerful automation feature. Using server-side plug-
ins, a form can be received by a program which makes
decisions about delegation given the current approval
list and data contained within the form. A common
business process that could use such a feature is a
requisition form. For example, a department may be
allowed to buy items under a certain fixed price, but
if the total price is greater than a certain amount,
additional approval by a member of the purchasing
department might be required. A requisition work-
flow program could easily detect this condition and
expedite the purchase process by automatically for-
warding the form to people who can approve the pur-
chase or to people to whom they have delegated their
responsibility.
A workflow in our system can send its result to
another program. The receiving program could then
validate the entire form and perform the required op-
erations (e.g. File an order, perform database ma-
nipulations). With an increasing number of online
retailers exposing their order processes as web ser-
vices, it becomes possible to automate a larger num-
ber of business functions end-to-end within a common
application such as WSEmail.
Because WSEmail also functions as a decentralized
system, a workflow form can extend across multi-
ple enterprises. All of the enterprises in the work-
flow would need to have an agreement to trust a
common certification authority (CA) or cross-trust
each other, but that is the only additional configura-
8
Figure 11: Sample Workflow Scenario
tion that is needed. With that setup, they can use
routed forms in WSEmail to create multi-enterprise
processes. There are many applications that could
use such a setup such as negotiating prices with a
supplier or gathering approvals for press releases from
interdependent corporations. Since the data is con-
tained within the email message, the question of who
hosts the data and applications for the exchange is
eliminated. WSEmail simply sends the data wher-
ever it is required.
4.3 On-Demand Attachments
Attaching files to email has long been a simple and
convenient way to send files to a group. However,
there are a variety of problems with email attach-
ments that WSEmail sought to improve. Except for
certain proprietary email systems, there is no version
control system for email attachments, which usually
results in many message resends so that each person
gets the newest version of a file. Second, the way
attachments are bundled in POP3 requires users to
download the entire message and attachments, even
if the user only wants to read the message (a prob-
lem solved in IMAP4 (IETF RFC 3501) and criti-
cal to bandwidth and power limited devices such as
smartphones). A common solution is to post the at-
tachment on a secured website and just send a link in
the message as various cloud providers allow. Unfor-
tunately, this creates an administrative and security
headache since attachments are stored on third-party
servers and senders must set up access control rules
and authentication on an external server or for recip-
ients who are not in their administrative domain.
Figure 12: On Demand Attachments Protocol
WSEmail solves the problem by introducing the
concept of “on-demand” attachments. Simply, mes-
sage attachments are handled as a plug-in to the
WSEmail base protocols. The plug-in implements
9
both the IExtensionProcessor and ISendingProcessor
interfaces. The client creates a message that con-
tains information about the attachment such as its
size, description and a SHA1 hash in addition to the
normal fields a message contains. The request to the
server contains the message as normal, along with
the attachments in DIME format. As the message
is received by the server, the request is intercepted
by the “on-demand” plug-in using the ISendingPro-
cessor interface. The plug-in can gain access to the
DIME attachments in the requests. The attachments
are stripped from the request and saved to a database
along with a list of all the recipients. Globally Unique
Identifiers (GUIDs) are generated and injected in to
the original message such that each GUID relates to
one of the DIME attachments. Delivery of the mes-
sage now continues normally.
A user who receives a copy of the message will see
that a file is attached, but will not have a copy it
yet. The user just has the GUID for the file and
the location from which it can be obtained. If the
user decides to retrieve the attachment, she first ac-
quires a federated identity token. The token is pre-
sented using the IExtensionProcessor interface to the
server that originally stripped the attachment along
with the GUID. The server verifies the authenticity
of the token and that the supplied user’s token is per-
mitted access to the GUID. If there is a match, the
server sends the attachment back to the requestor as
a DIME attachment. An overview of the protocol is
shown in Figure 12.
We specified the on-demand attachments proto-
col formally using the TulaFale [5] specification lan-
guage, which has constructs for public key signatures
and salted password authentication. The TulaFale
script compiles to a script that is verifiable with the
ProVerif protocol verifier of Bruno Blanchet (version
1.11) [7]. With this we were able to prove the follow-
ing correspondence theorem for on-demand attach-
ments: if a receiving client (RC) retrieves an on-
demand attachment with SC (sending client) as its
return address, then SC sent the attachment. De-
tails of the proof and its construction can be found
in Lux et al. [17] and at http://www2.kinneret.ac.
il/mjmay/wsemail/.
5 Experiments
Web services are often criticized for being slow based
on their design and existing implementation plat-
forms. Security and flexibility also provide a per-
formance challenge. Hence a secure, flexible imple-
mentation of messaging based on web services raises
concerns about performance. We implemented a pro-
totype for WSEmail as a way to address these con-
cerns at the same time as illustrating the benefits of
flexibility. In order to evaluate the efficiency of our
messaging system, we built a test bed to stress test
our implementation’s application and protocols. In
this section we describe the implementation, the test
bed, and our experiments.
We simulated a real world email environment
where many users share a common email server.
Users may exchange messages with other users within
the local domain or external domains. Users may
also interact with their personal inboxes to view and
delete messages. For our test we defined four stan-
dard email operations: send, list, retrieve, and delete.
These operations are discussed in detail below.
All of our code can be downloaded from https:
//github.com/lux-k/wsemail.
5.1 Implementation
Our WSEmail prototype runs on Windows server and
client systems. Version 1.0 was implemented over the
.NET framework version 1.1 and relies on the Web
Services Enhancement (WSE) 1.0, CAPICOM 2.00,
SQL Server 2000 (to store messages for the server),
and IIS 5.0. The current version consists of 68 inter-
faces and 343 classes organized into 30 projects (see
Appendix B for a UML model illustrating the design).
Most of the software is C# .NET managed code cre-
ated with Microsoft Visual Studio. Unmanaged code
was needed to gain access to lower-level DNS func-
tions necessary to query for SRV records. Our in-
stant messaging system also exploits a TLS package
from Mentalis (mentalis.org) since the .NET 1.1 plat-
form does not provide native support for server TLS
sockets. In November 2004 we upgraded WSEmail to
version 1.1 in order to get WS-Policy support from
Microsoft WSE 2.0. This was challenging because
primitive functions from WSE 1.0 that we needed for
our WSEmail 1.0 implementation were removed from
the WSE 2.0 package forcing us to use both WSE 1.0
and WSE 2.0 to implement WSEmail 1.1.
WSEmail uses DNS SRV records (IETF RFC 2782)
to determine routing. This makes it possible to run
WSEmail over other protocols without changing the
way DNS is queried, and we can exploit the priority
and weight attributes in the records. These proper-
ties of the SRV record allow for future enhancement
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and present day configuration that is extremely sim-
ilar to the way SMTP is deployed now.
5.2 Test Bed
Our test bed consisted of a total of four client ma-
chines, two mail servers (designated as local and ex-
ternal), one test coordinator and one database/DNS
server. The arrangement of the test bed is depicted
in Figure 13.
The test clients (labeled as T1 through T4) all per-
formed operations by sending requests to the “local”
email server, Si. The test client actions were coordi-
nated by the test coordinator, Stc. There also was a
second server, Se , which acted as both an “external”
email server and a load generator for the “local” sys-
tem. Sdb hosted a message storage database and DNS
records for Si and Se. The clients all had Pentium 4
2.8GHz processors with 512MB of memory and the
Windows XP Pro operating system. They performed
four different operations during the test execution:
send a message to a recipient; list the headers of mes-
sages in the client’s inbox, retrieve a particular mes-
sage, delete a particular message. We explored var-
ious ways to include a mixture of applications with
these basic operations but found it difficult to iso-
late performance issues clearly in doing this, so we
restricted our focus to a demonstration of the basic
operations.
The test coordinator, Stc, was responsible for dis-
tributing the test specifications, starting the test and
receiving the results from each client. The coordi-
nator Stc broadcasted its network address, instruct-
ing all clients to connect to it and download the test
specifications file. The clients then waited for Stc to
announce the start of the test, after which the clients
executed requests to Si in compliance with the specs
they downloaded. After each client finished, the la-
tencies for each request were reported back to Stc.
The test specifications document described exactly
what each client was to do. It indicated whether
the client should authenticate using a username to-
ken (user name and password) or X.509 certificate.
It also specified how many messages were to be sent
from each client, to whom they were to be sent, and
the size of the message body. The specification docu-
ment also indicated the total number of requests that
should be sent and the ratios of the four types of re-
quests.
The local server Si was the focus of our test. It
accepted incoming messages from the clients and an
external server Se. It performed the necessary au-
thentication and forwarded external messages to the
appropriate destination after performing DNS reso-
lution. If the destination was local (for example, the
recipient is on Si), then the message was stored in
Sdb. If the destination was external, the message was
forwarded to Se. We allowed the local and external
server to share a database and DNS server since these
were not performance bottlenecks in the system.
The external server Se played two roles in our test
bed. First, it imitated the entire external client list,
so that all emails directed to any external client were
forwarded to it. On reception of a message addressed
to one of the clients that it simulated, it did not save
it to the database server. This was done to prevent Si
from experiencing extra latency due to Se’s database
transaction. Rather, it performed the required cer-
tificate checking to verify authenticity and then dis-
carded the message. Second, it acted as a load gen-
erator and sent one message per second addressed to
each of the four clients: T1 - T4. These messages
were all received by Si, authenticated, and stored in
Sdb.
5.3 Procedure and Results
The test coordinator Stc provided a test specifica-
tion document that instructed each client to run one
execution thread sending 2,000 requests to Si. The
clients chose send, list, retrieve, and delete operations
with 25% chance. In cases where the delete operation
was to be performed on an unpopulated inbox, it was
considered a no-op and not counted towards the re-
sults. To avoid this condition, each client’s inbox was
primed with about six messages. To get the most out
of each send event, each message was addressed to
both a randomly chosen local client and an external
client. The clients were all instructed to authenti-
cate to Si using username token authentication. Si
and Se authenticated to each other using X.509 cer-
tificate signing. The duration of the test was 1826
seconds.
In order to get a client-side view of the efficiency
of the system, we measured the latency of each re-
quest. A timer was started as the client contacted Si
with a request and stopped after the client received
the appropriate response (e.g. inbox listing, message
received confirmation). The time difference between
the client’s request and the server’s complete response
was the latency of the operation. The results of this
calculation point to an average of 0.284 seconds per
request with a variance of 0.1389 seconds. The mini-
mum and the maximum latencies were 46.876 ms and
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Figure 13: Testbed Architecture
4.0 seconds respectively. Note that the “Message Re-
ceived” confirmation does not mean that the message
was delivered to the ultimate recipient, just that the
message was placed in the delivery queue.
The test results in Table 1 show the throughput of
bytes sent in MB as a breakdown of the number of
requests (send, list, retrieve and delete). Therefore
the total data in MB from the clients to Si is 36.18
MB and from the Si to all the clients is 369.35 MB.
Since each message is also sent to an external client,
each send action also sends a message from Si to Se.
The data are measured according to the representa-
tion in Table 2. Therefore, the total volume of data
exchanged from Si to Se is 30.95 MB and from Se to
Si is 30.69 MB.
The entire test bed data transfer was recorded
using the Ethereal network monitor, which was
run at Si and Se. The TCP/IP sessions were
reconstructed using tcpflow (https://github.com/
simsong/tcpflow) and post-processed with Perl and
awk. Since Se, acting as a load generator, sent one
message per second, 1826 messages were sent from Se
to Si over the duration of the test. The correspond-
ing byte count represents the messages that were sent
and the notification messages that were received.
5.4 Analysis
A best case test of SMTP with no load on the server
or network and no contention for resources yielded
an average latency of 0.170 ms to send a message of
about the same size as the WSEmail messages we
sent in our experiment. The average difference in la-
tency between WSEmail and the SMTP test is 0.114
ms, which accounts for the additional overhead of the
XML parsing and cryptography. In that short time
span a large number of operations took place: one
secret key signature, one private key signature verifi-
cation, two public key signatures, and one public key
signature verification. Since the entire system uses
XML, we conclude that performance is not a barrier
to secure web services in this type of application. The
extra latency would likely be unnoticeable a typical
client/server environment.
XML and XMLDSIG do have a drawback in their
verbosity. Our test bed sent 1 KB mail messages
which ballooned to 10 KB responses to the retrieve
message action in order to make XMLDSIG work.
At least 30% of those bytes were the Base64 encoded
representations of the certificates used for signing
messages. After the certificate size, the WS-Security
structures were also a significant amount of overhead,
accounting for about 30% of the bytes transferred.
WSEmail might need to explore ways to distribute
certificates so that they are not replicated excessively.
It might also be useful to examine how messages are
signed to minimize their verbosity.
Our experiments bode well for web service effi-
ciency, especially for high volume messaging. Extend-
ing our experimental results, we find that WSEmail is
theoretically capable of handling approximately 1787
messages a minute (combination of incoming and out-
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Operation Send List Retrieve Delete
# of requests 1970 2024 2026 1980
% of all requests 24.6 25.3 25.4 24.7
Client→Server Data (MB) 10.74 8.42 8.62 8.4
Server→Client Data (MB) 12.31 324.55 20.41 12.08
Table 1: Bytes sent between clients and Si
Server Name # messages Sent (MB) Received Confirmations (MB)
Si 1970 2024 2026
Se 24.6 25.3 25.4
Table 2: Bytes sent between Si and Se
going). We looked for published benchmarks to com-
pare this against and found that the University of
Wisconsin-Parkside had a peak usage of 1716 (to-
tal of incoming and outgoing) messages per minute
over a year, meaning it should be possible for a single
WSEmail server similar to our test system to rou-
tinely handle the normal load at that institution.
6 Related Work and Similar
Systems
Work related to WSEmail can be divided into two
general areas: the analysis of web service security
and improved Internet messaging systems.
Email Improvements Improvements to the
SMTP messaging system have often been motivated
by two, sometimes overlapping goals: strong message
authentication and spam prevention. PGP offers
authentication tools that include public/private key
signing and encryption. Privacy Enhancement Mail
(PEM) (IETF RFCs 1421-4) has mechanisms for
privacy, integrity, source authentication, and nonre-
pudiation using public and private key encryption
and end-to-end encryption techniques. Zhou et
al.[21] use formal tools to verify the properties of the
PEM system. Abadi et al. [1] use a trusted third
party to achieve message and source authentication
and formally prove correctness of their protocol.
Changes to the SMTP system aimed at spam re-
duction include DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
(IETF RFC 6376) which uses public key cryp-
tography and an option for server signed (rather
than client-signed) messages and Petmail (http://
petmail.lothar.com/). Petmail uses the GPG en-
cryption utility for public key encryption and signing
of messages. Users are identified by IDRecords, self-
signed binary blobs that include public key, identity,
and message routing information. Petmail agents can
enforce IDRecord whitelists and policies for contact
from first time senders. First-time senders may be
forced to obtain tickets from a third party Ticket
Server which may perform checks to ensure that the
sender is a human (using CAPTCHA reverse Turing
tests.) Messages can be encapsulated and sent using
SMTP, Jabber, or some other queuing transport pro-
tocol. Patterns and options for sender anonymity are
offered as well. Our most recent work on extensions
of WSEmail show how to do several of these things
and more based on WS-Policy negotiations and our
dynamic plug-in capability.
Web Service Security Regarding web services se-
curity analyses, the Samoa project at Microsoft Re-
search developed important fundamentals, including
a formal semantics for proving web services authen-
tication theorems [4] and the TulaFale language for
automating web service security protocol proofs [5].
Based on their ideas and others, we have performed
followup work based on WSEmail, including adaptive
middleware messaging policy systems [2], attribute-
based messaging [8], and a secure alert messaging pro-
tocol [11].
6.1 Instant Messaging Systems
Several vendor-specific all-in-one internet messag-
ing systems have been developed recently, including
Google Talk, Skype, WeChat, Slack, and WhatsApp.
As we noted above, all provide security at the expense
of openness. Some allow extensions and integrated
apps, but only via a centralized service.
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GMail and Hangouts Google’s GMail platform
evolved from an email system to include a chatting
service called Google Talk in 2005 and a unified plat-
form called Hangouts in 2013. The talk application
has similarities to WSEmail in that it integrates IM
with email messages (allowing conversion between the
two) and integrates with other chat protocols such as
Jabber. Talk differs from WSEmail in that it uses
hop-by-hop encryption instead of end-to-end [13]. It
is also primarily client-server based (via Google), al-
though it will route calls in a peer-to-peer manner
if possible [12]. Talk and Hangouts use proprietary
communication protocols, so the platforms are not
amenable to third party extensions.
Skype Skype integrates voice and chat into one
app. Chat messages sent to offline users are sent like
emails - stored on the server and delivered to the tar-
get at next login. Skype’s security model is similar
to WSEmail’s secure chat architecture in that it uses
public key encrypted messages and challenges for au-
thentication, establishes a shared key, and then uses
the shared key to create a secure end-to-end chan-
nel. It uses proprietary protocols and does not offer
integration with other chat or voice communication
tools [6].
WeChat WeChat is a popular chat service that
provides instant messaging and chatting services. Its
communication protocol is proprietary, but forensic
analyses and protocol analyses have found that its
communication protocols are server based and en-
crypted using a custom combination of a fixed RSA
key and derived AES keys [14, 18]. WeChat allows
for integration of miniprograms within its tool via its
centralized servers.
Slack Slack’s security protocols are based on TLS
1.2, SHA2, and AES [19]. The details of the protocols
are proprietary, but black box testing and protocol
analysis have shown them to be server based with no
peer-to-peer or direct connections [15]. In contrast to
other closed systems, Slack enables the introduction
of bots, software agents which listen to conversations
and data and act based on them.
OTR The Off the Record (OTR) [9] protocol in-
troduces a mechanism for secret, authenticated low-
latency communication which preserves the ability for
participants to repudiate their messages later. OTR
has been installed a number of operating systems and
secure chat tools such as cryptocat.
WhatsApp The WhatsApp client authentication
protocol has undergone significant changes in the past
three years. The pre-2016 WhatsApp client authenti-
cation steps (see Karpisek, et al.[16] and Anglano [3])
are as follows. At installation time, a shared pass-
word pw was generated for the user account which
was stored in /data/data/com.whatsapp/files/pw
on the device and transferred to the WhatsApp
servers. Login then consisted of the following steps:
1. At log in, the client sends an initial auth mes-
sage with its client number and the method it
wants to use for authentication. The message
isn’t encrypted. The message includes informa-
tion about the client software version and capa-
bilities.
2. The server responds with some parameters which
include a nonce n.
3. The client and server use pw and n to generate
four keys using PBKDF2: kse (server encryp-
tion), ksi (server integrity), kce (client encryp-
tion), and kci (client integrity).
Since 2015, WhatsApp has used the Signal proto-
col, an end-to-end encryption scheme based on an el-
liptical curve public/private key pair generated at in-
stall time [20]. It uses the Signal ratcheting protocol
for instant messaging and voice communication [10].
WhatsApp is a closed source system that does not en-
able extensions or integration with third party clients.
7 Conclusion
We have explored WSEmail, the development of
email functions as a family of web services, by de-
veloping a prototype system based on an architec-
ture that emphasizes flexibility, security, and integra-
tion. We have shown that WSEmail is amenable to
the addition of new protocols and the formal anal-
ysis of these protocols. We have also shown that
the basic WSEmail functions have satisfactory per-
formance. In ongoing work, we are exploring sev-
eral directions such as: new applications that exploit
improved integration between web-like data retrieval
functions and the messaging system; challenges to
interoperability with a Java implementation of the
MUA; and ways to express and negotiate messaging
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policies. For widespread use, WSEmail faces substan-
tial problems with standardization and interoperabil-
ity with SMTP, which may be mitigated by writing
more plug-ins like our SMTP-compatible relay agent.
However, it is well-suited to some high-security appli-
cations even now, offers ideas in exploring the general
design space for Internet messaging, and can rely on
the standardization advantages of XML as an aid to
addressing interoperability challenges. We also aim
to support WSEmail on diverse platforms. A project
of Heo, Patel, and Shah was partially successful in
doing this for a Java WSEmail client based on Sun’s
JWSDP 1.4 with X.509 security.
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A Client Screen Shots
Figures 14 and 15 are screen shots from the WSEmail
client program.
B UML Class Diagrams
Figure 17 and 16 shows the UML class diagram for
the server side implementation and plugin architec-
ture respectively.
Figure 14: Inbox screen
Figure 15: Instant Messaging screen
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Figure 16: Server architecture with plugins
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Figure 17: Server implementation class diagram
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